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Corporate Resolutions. By Isabel Drummond. New York, The Ronald
Press Co., 1926. pp. xviii, 321.
In Part I, the author writes that "the collection of resolutions of all
types contained in this volume will furnish a pattern for almost every
requirement." There are presented some fifty forms of resolutions for re-
cording stockholders' votes and five times as many for evidencing directors"
transactions. A supplementary section designated Corporate Notices, con-
sists of forms of meeting-notices and of miscellaneous communications
which for various purposes may be sent to stockholders, creditors or othero.
This collection is preceded by a short commentary headed History and
Analysis of the Law Governing Corporate Resolutions; but inasmuch as
upon many of the points purported to be covered (as for instance the status
of ultra vires acts or insufficiently authorized transactions) there is wide
conflict of law as between different jurisdictions, and many qualifications
of general rules in all jurisdictions, this part of the volume can be of little
help to a lawyer and certainly none to a layman.
In determining the usefulness of a reference book such as this, one is
met at the outset by the fact that the proceedings of corporations vary in
form, subject and detail to an almost unlimited e.xtent. In the greater num-
ber of instances, the corporate record requires not a recital in a particular
form, but a statement complete and unambiguous in substance. In the
cases where form is more or less essential, the differing requirements of
law in the several states make impracticable the use of a general model.
From this point of view, the comments on the forms of resolutions apply
equally in respect of the forms of corporate notices.
While the author separates her collection of resolutions into two parts,
one of stockholders' resolutions and the other of directors' resolutions, the
essential division from either a legal or practical standpoint is that be-
tween (a) resolutions evidencing action required by applicable corporation
laws, in which class may be included transactions subject to particular
provisions of the corporate charter, and (b) resolutions evidencing transac-
tions in the course of the business administration of the company.
In the first class may be mentioned incorporation procedure, charter
amendments (including changes in authorized stock, purposes, powers, num-
ber of directors, and other matters of substance), increase or reduction of
issued stock or capital, dissolution, sale of entire assets, consolidations,
mergers and other structural changes, and also in many states the crea-
tion of mortgage or other debt. As to such transactions the resolutions
and documents must meet the requirements of the law of the state in
which the company is incorporated. The form appropriate for Pennsyl-
vania may be entirely inappropriate in New York or in M!aryland. In
some jurisdictions also the corporation departments have adopted forms
to be followed in the case of certificates (which often include a recital of
resolutions) required to be filed in the public offices. It is difficult there-
fore to see the value of including in a book for general circulation a form
appropriate only in Pennsylvania or in one or more other states. Indeed
in a footnote to one of these local forms the author herself refers to the
necessity of consulting the statutes to ascertain the requirements in other
states. The conclusion follows necessarily that the draftsman of a reso-
lution to evidence proceedings regulated by statute, will more certainly
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comply with the law by conforming the phraseology of the resolution to
that of the statute as closely as may be, omitting no pertinent part but
adding any necessary details. It is generally advisable to follow this course
also in respect of a form issued by a state department-to follow the
form in haec verba.
As to the second class of corporate transactions-those relating to the
internal administration or business activities-the forms of resolves are
neither more nor less useful to a company secretary than are models of
business letters to a merchant. Such forms may suggest ideas, but they
are seldom suitable for use as a copy. When particular phraseology is not
suggested by the statute or required by a public office or by the person
with which the corporation is dealing, a simple statement of the action
taken, however informal, is sufficient to record the transaction in the min-
ute book. At directors' meetings more often than not, the chairman or
another will describe a proposed transaction and recommend that it be
authorized or approved; and in any such case the minutes will be ade-
quate if they recite the proposition as presented and follow it by the
statement that it was adopted or rejected, as the case may be.
It is true, as remarked by the author, that records of corporations show
many resolutions which are ambiguous and confused in expression. That
is true also of business letters and contracts in many instances; other-
wise there would be less commercial litigation. To avoid such defects
in adapting a form requires as much if not more thought than is needed
to phrase an original composition. The remedy is not to be found in the
use of a general book of forms, for no such collection of precedents could
be made so comprehensive as to be safe for indiscriminating use.
GEORGE H. GARDINER
The Colorado River Compact. By Reuel Leslie Olson. Los Angeles, Pub-
lished by the Author, 1926. pp. xxiv, 527.
Seven states, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, Arizona
and California, have portions of their territory within the drainage basin
of the Colorado and hence are referred to as Colorado River Basin states.
Pursuant to the permission for such compacts contained in Article I, Sec-
tion 10, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of the United States, and under
the authorization of special acts of the legislatures of the seven states and
the Congress of the United States, Colorado River Commissioners repre-
senting these states, with Mr. Herbert Hoover, who represented the United
States, as chairman, after two years of public hearings and negotiations,
on November 24, 1922, formulated and signed at Santa Fe, Now Mexico,
the document known as the Colorado River Compact. This so-called com-
pact is not yet a compact in fact because it has not been ratified by the
legislatures of Arizona and California, or by the Congress of the United
States. It is this inchoate compact which furnishes the title for the volume
under review.
The proposal for the compact originated in the Upper Basin states, and
probably with Mr. Delph E. Carpenter, Water Commissioner for Colorado.
Plans for development of the Colorado River, which called for the construc-
tion of large storage reservoirs and diversion of the water from the
river, particularly in California, were being agitated. The Upper Basin
states looked with apprehension upon developments in the Lower Basin
which might create priorities of right to the use of the waters of the
river against their use for future development in the Upper Basin. This
anxiety was increased by the unsettled state of the law governing the
water rights on interstate streams, and the long delays that had been ex-
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perienced in settling disputes on these questions in the Supreme Court
of the United States. The hope of the framers of the compact, as stated
by Professor Olson (page 97) was that the compact-
"would provide a basis for the determination of disputes in the Colorado
River area in situations not covered by existing statutory and case law.
The ordinary rules of prior appropriation were to be supplemented by pro-
visions definitely agreed upon by the States concerned."
The two leading eases upon the subject decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States [Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 655 (1907)
and Wyozing v. Colorado, 243 U. S. 622, 37 Sup. Ct. 379 (1917)] did not
determine the "issues presented by storage and diversion of water in one
state for use in another. The physical features of the Colorado make
such storage and diversion essential."
The Commissioners in negotiating the compact abandoned the attempt
to define the rights of each state to the water, and the compact as signed
represented a division of the water and a definition of rights as to water
between the two groups of states in the Basin-Wyoming, Colorado, New
Meico and Utah as the Upper Basin states, and California, Nevada and
Arizona as the Lower Basin states.
From the lawyer's standpoint, the most interesting chapter of the book
is that on Constitutional Questions. Here the troublesome questions of
rights to the water of an interstate stream as between the states them-
selves, and as between the states and the federal government, are dealt
with. It is this latter question around which much of the bitterest con-
flict is raging at this time, not only in the courts, but in the debates in
the Congress of the United States. There is involved the question of the
right of the United States to proceed with a development in the absence
of state agreement, where the best-recognized right of the United States
must be based upon the navigability of the stream in question. The au-
thorities cited and the extracts from discussions presented in the text
and footnotes of this chapter are the evident results of careful research.
The author does not attempt to state definite conclusions of his own from
his study of the arguments. Three chapters are devoted to a project
for the construction of a huge storage dam at Boulder Canyon in the Lower
Basin where the Colorado is the boundary between Arizona and Nevada.
This project is embodied in the bill known as the Swing-Johnson Bill, or
Boulder Dam Bill, now before the national Congress. The material for
these chapters is largely recruited from hearings before congressional
committees and public discussions aroused by this measure.
No problem of the West presents more diverse and interesting issues
than this of the development of the Colorado. Under what conditions
the Lower Basin states with their more imminent needs shall be per-
mitted to proceed without prejudice to the Upper Basin states, how the
river shall be controlled to prevent floods, how power development shall
be handled, where and to what size dams shall be built, how diversions for
irrigation and domestic water shall be made-these are some of the ques-
tions the Colorado River presents to those who would harness and control
it for human service.
It is interesting to find that Mr. Olson, although he has entitled his
thesis "The Colorado River Compact," arrives at the conclusion that the
Compact should be abandoned as the means for solution of the problems
which it attempted to meet. He says (page 197) "The Compact attempted
too much. . . . It is quite unlikely that the Colorado River Compact
signed by the representatives of the States in Santa Fe in November, 1922,
will ever be ratified by the seven States. A new method must be adopted,
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and if it is to secure the support vf the different States, its first concern
must be the development of a governmental instrumentality in which the
sections of the Colorado River area will have confidence." This conclu-
sion is the more striking in view of the fact that the only measure for
the development of the lower River, now actively considered, the Boulder
Dam Bill, is wholly based upon the assumption that the Colorado River
Compact will be ratified by at least six states. If it is to be abandoned,
this legislation must be refrained and started anew on a different basis.
For a solution of the "engineering, economic, constitutional, legal, and
political difficulties" discussed in his thesis, the author suggests the crea-
tion of a "Colorado River Authority" by the seven interested states. This
plan, the author says, is suggested to him by the developments of the
Port of New York Authority. It is interesting to note that much the
same suggestion for handling the development of the Colorado and its
problems is presented by Representative Hayden of Arizona in his minority
report opposing the Swing-Johnson Bill, which report was filed with the
House of Representatives in January, 1927. A similar suggestion has also
been made for handling the development of the St. Lawrence.
It would seem that the author abandons the Compact rather hastily.
It is by no means certain that the Compact plan is not feasible or that it
will not be carried through. It is the product of much effort and of
some of the ablest and most experienced minds in the country. The alter-
native suggested entails the creation of a new governmental agency, neither
state nor national, but apparently subject to all the influences, political
and otherwise, that existing agencies must meet. One familiar with the
activities of the hundreds of commissions and agencies now busying them-
selves with the affairs of our citizens, shudders at the prospect of the
growth of an entirely new group of such agencies. It is to be devoutly
hoped that we will not, without the most deliberate and careful study,
add to our already complicated structures of state and national agencies,
and their increasing conflicts, by the injection of this new agency. There
would be more to attract in the suggestion if it promised relief from the
expansion of federal bureaucracy, but there is nothing to indicate that it
would do more than to check its spread by substitution of another bu-
reaucracy.
However that may be, the significant fact, so far as the Colorado River
is concerned, is that some of those who, like Mr. Olson, have given years
of study to these problems, should suggest a new basis for interstate co-
operation. This fact, in conjunction with the continuing disagreement be-
tween the states suggests that there may yet be years of public discus-
sion with the consequent trying delay, before the development of the
Colorado on a comprehensive scale gets under way.
This much is certain: Around the problems of this great river, which
has been called the greatest undeveloped resource of the country, many
conflicts of national importance will yet rage. In the western states,
water is a subject which stirs emotions to their depths. The precedent set
on the Colorado will have a widespread influence in the solution of similar
problems in the Northwest, on the St. Lawrence and elsewhere. There
are involved states' rights questions, both as to the right of the states
to control and regulate their own economic resources and their right to
control the disposition of waters which flow within their boundaries; there
are also involved national policies, such as the relation of the federal
government to the development of hydro-electric power on a scale here-
tofore unknown. The solution and discussion of these and other problems
will stimulate many books-historical, scientific and romantic. So far as
the Colorado is concerned, future students will be grateful to Mr. Olson
for his painstaking research, and the preservation and collation of much
BOOK REVIEWS
valuable material. One who wislibs to understand the issues on the Colo-
rado cannot afford to overlook this volume.
The voluminous footnotes and e.Chibits in the appendix will attract only
the careful student. Some of the material included in these notes serves
no useful purpose and the inclusion of some of it must be attributoA to
the zealous and ill-advised enthusiasm of a youthful author. But on the
whole the material, both in text and notes, will be found enlightening, in-
teresting and useful.
W. C. MU _.-.oR
Man and the State. By William Ernest Hocking. New Haven, Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1926. pp. xv, 463.
In this volume, the first of a projected trilogy on political philosophy,
Professor Hocking deals elaborately with two philosophically primary ques-
tions: the "purpose," or justifying raison d'tre, of the state, and the
consequent scope of its legitimate activities. The state's ideal purpose he
defines in uncommonly broad terms; but its practical sphere of action he
would apparently limit rather narrowly. Mr. Hocking will have none of
the doctrine that, in its relation to its citizens, the state exists solely for
the maintenance of public order and security and for the provision of
means for the equitable adjustment of inter-individual conflicts of purpose
and interest. Nor does it suffice even to add to these the function of pro-
moting the "well-being" of the citizens. Social psychology, the author
thinks, and consequently political theory, have too much neglected an ele-
ment in human nature for which he finds it needful to coin a name--the
"commotive impulses." The "will to power," which is the fundamental
attribute of man, is not merely an urge to do and to create individually; it
is also an urge to engage in interesting and significant enterprises which
can only be carried on jointly. The will of the individual is "a will about
what others shall do, and not alone a will about what he himself shall do"
(page 156), and "the state is this unified will-surplus" of its members; it
"exists to make it possible for individual men to realize their fully inter-
preted wills to power" (page 325), and therefore "its function is to do
things, and not merely to keep order while its citizens do things" (page
170). Its business, in short, is to "make history." And it is not merely
with external collective enterprises, nor with the external conditions for
successful co-operation, that the state is concerned; its province reaches
to the "motives of action," it "belongs to its purpose to promote a just
inner disposition" in its citizens (page 175). "If the form of the state's
aim is the making of history, its substance is the making of men."
It is assuredly a true observation that "a will about what others shall
do"--and not do-is highly characteristic of the human individual. But
the fact becomes pertinent to a theory about the state only when one bears
in mind that the distinctive way in which the state, as contrasted with all
voluntary associations, can serve this will is the way of coercion. In so
far as C wants to do what the "commotive impulses" of A and B demand
that he shall do, the specific problem of the state does not arise; they can
form a club to make whatever "history" they like. The political philoso-
pher is not interested until the question is asked, Why, and how far, and
under what conditions, is it legitimate for A and B to enforce upon C their
"will about what he shall do"? The author's answer to the second and
third of these questions is not altogether clear. "The deeds of the state,"
we are told, "must be commonly believed in or approved. This excludes
enterprises which are not readily defensible on accepted grounds before
the common judgment" (page 167). Does "commonly" here mean "unani-
mously" or "almost unanimously"? If so, it would appear that the state
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is essentially a means of organizing voluntary co-operation, and may exer-
cise virtually no coercive power; the position borders on philosophical an-
archism. And this interpretation is borne out by other passages. "The
state governs best that governs least," in the sense that "no part of it
is exercising a displacing stress on any other part" (page 192). The state,
again, is "excluded from any field or degree of action" which would "di-
minish the scope of private enterprise" or "displace the private will" (pages
67-68). The number of "common deeds" of which the state could be the
organizer, if it conformed to these requirements, would not seem likely to
be great. Elsewhere it would appear that only an "eventual unanimity" is
requisite; e. g., "the American Civil War will be justified, as a forcible
majority decision, only if its main object is eventually approved by the
South as 'well as the North" (page 384). Since present problems cannot,
as a rule, await settlement until the opinion of remote posterity is as-
certained, this hardly seems helpful as a practical formulation of the
limits of the right to coerce. In other places Mr. Hocking grants explicitly
that the state may "compel co-operation in its history-making enterprises";
"there is always a minority whom the state in effect coerces" (pages 188-
189). From these and other relevant passages I find it impossible to
gather any definite and coherent doctrine as to when and how far coercion
is justified, and what specific sorts of "history-making enterprises" the
state may undertake. But the prevailing tendency seems to be towards
the view that, at the least, far more than the consent of a majority is
requisite to give moral legitimacy to any law.
Behind these questions there is, of course, a prior one, which for a
great part of historic political philosophy has been the fundamental issue.
What, in general, is the moral basis of any exercise of coercive power by
the state? In its form, Mr. Hocking's answer to this is of a familiar type:
the state is really based upon a universal actual consent. Since "all men
have the will to power," and since "the will to power requires the state,"
all men do in fact (though some may have "introspective impressions to
the contrary") will the existence of the state. Now it is, no doubt, true
that nearly all men desire certain things which only a state exercising
some coercive functions can give them; but are these the things which Mr.
Hocking denotes by the word "power"? His use of the term is somewhat
elusive. It has evidently for him no Nietzschean sense: the will to power
is, we are told, "completely mutual and non-competitive"; it includes "the
will to serve"; it is apparently defined as a yearning "in one's own way to
alter the universe for good" (page 321) ; and a constant element in it is a
desire to produce effects that shall be permanent. "A concrete historic
immortality is the unabandonable goal of the will; it is what all men most
deeply desire" (page 330). These are ethically elevated conceptions, but
they are put forward not as ethics but as psychology; and it is difficult to
recognize in them a precise description of the habitual preoccupations of
the average sensual man, who is the stuff of which Leviathan is chiefly
made. They hardly afford, therefore, the requisite factual basis for the
type of reasoning attempted, and they have little relevancy to the concrete
problems of law and politics.
I have dealt solely-and inadequately-with the main issues of the
book. But it is not, I think, in its treatment of these that its chief value
and interest lie. On a large number of incidental but important topics on
which he touches in his wide-ranging discussion, Mr. Hocking has original,
wise and thought-provoking things to say, which will reward even the





The Present Status of the Philosophy of Law and of Right . By William
Ernest Hocking. N~w Haven, Yale University Press, 1926. pp. dii, 97.
There was a time when philosophers wrote books upon natural philosophy,
mental philosophy and moral philosophy. With the development of modern
science these fields have gradually been removed from the jurisdiction of
the philosopher and turned over to the students of physical science, psy-
chology and ethics. To be sure, psychology and ethics have not yet ,uc-
ceeded in fully winning their independence or in adjusting themselves to
the new situation. Behavior patterns acquired in the old environment
still influence them, although there are signs that psychology at least is
finally on the way to discovering a truly scientific basis upon which to
work. That we have as yet no science of law is evidenced by the fact
that professional philosophers who know little of law still write boolzs
upon the philosophy of law, although they would never dream of under-
taking one on, say, philosophy of medicine. The present little book: is
an example of this habit of philosophers. Doubtless the author's philo-
sophical brethren will be interested in its contents; as a contribution to
legal science its value is small. The author may of courze reply that
philosophy is not science. However this may be, the statement that "it
is the business of the philosopher to connect law with its permanent roots
in the nature of things" warns us what to expect. Just what this state-
ment means the reviewer is uncertain. If philosophy would stop pretend-
ing that it has some peculiar technique which leads to a special Idnd of
knowledge which possesses greater validity than the results reached by
science, and would turn its attention to the study of the major abstrac-
tions of science, as indeed Dewey, Russell, Whitehead and others are doing,
it would discover that an adequate knowledge of the concrete data within
the specific fields to which the abstractions are to be applied is a pre-
requisite to useful discussion.
The reviewer has been unable to give any definite content of meaning to
the more important statements in the book. Thus we are told that "it
is objectively 'right' that an individual should develop his powers, what-
ever they are," under any system of law. Modern biological and psy-
chological science tell us, however, that human beings at birth are, so
to speak, complex packages of chemicals which have the capacity to de-
velop into many different things under varying environments. Does the
quoted statement mean that each such "package" has a "right" to develop
in all of these possible directions, even though many of them are socially
undesirable in view of his cultural surroundings; or in only some of
them, and if so, in which? A study of modern mathematics would per-
haps disclose to the author that this "statement" really states nothing;
that it is what Russell has named a "propositional function" and not a
proposition, i. e., it contains a term which is a "real variable," to which
any desired meaning can later be given as the discussion proceeds, but
which as it stands is devoid of specific content. Other statements in the
book suffer from the same defect.
Those who are interested will find a short summary of the fundamental
viewpoints of the two German legal philosophers, Kohler and Stammler.
This will be of interest to philosophers, and to lawyers who go in for that
sort of thing.
WALTER WMuLrn CooX
The Law as to C. 1. F. Contracts. Second Edition. By H. Gotein. London,
Effingham Wilson, 1926. pp. xv, 112.
The first edition of this little book appeared in 1924. In its latest form
it contains a table of 94 cases, an index, an appendix which quotes relevant
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portions of the Sales of Goods Act, Marine Insurance Act of 1906, and
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1924; and condensed statements of what
,he author believes to be the English law of C. 1. F. contracts, supported
and illustrated by short digests of English decisions and quotations there-
from. There is no elaboration, no criticism of cases, no proposal for the
disposition of any unsettled questions. Quite frankly the author puts for-
ward merely a summary analysis of the results of English litigation.
The C. I. F. (cost, insurance and freight) sales contract has long
had a wide use in English trade, has its counterpart in the French C. A. S.
contract,' and is increasingly noticeable in American business.2 Our
commercial lawyer or business man can find both English and American
decisions carefully discussed and criticised by American authors,3 but he
will doubtless discover it profitable to have at hand in simple and quickly
usable form an English barrister's collection of cardinal principles and
guiding decisions. It is unfortunate that neither the Sales of Goods Act
nor the Sales Act sheds direct light on the detailed construction of the
C. I. F. contract, although the term "C. 0. D." is considerably elucidated in
these statutes. What with "F. 0. B.," "F. A. S.," and "C. & F.," the
number of abbreviations which must be explained by litigation is suffi-
ciently large. It is hoped that merchants will not increase the use of these
trade short cuts. In a recent English case where "U. C. E." (unforeseen
contingencies excepted) was the bone of contention, Greer, J., said: 4 "It is
a pity that merchants will continue to use short hand expressions of this
kind, if I may so term them, without any definition of them in the con-
tract, and thus leave them to be interpreted by the Court."
It would seem that, if more alphabetical labels must be invented, trade
associations could serve a useful purpose by defining in detail the meaning
of the new symbols and impliedly or expressly incorporating such de-
tailed statements into their contracts.
GEORGE G. BOGERT
Cases on New York Practice. By Jay Leo Rothschild. New York, Baker,
Voorhis & Co., 1925. Vol. I, pp. xlv, 910. Vol. II, pp. xxxvi, 911-1721.
A collection of cases illustrative of the development of the law in any
of its branches does nbt lend itself readily to comment which is very helpful
or interesting. At best such comment may serve as one man's opinion
as to the availability of the collection for the purpose sought. If the case
book relates to the substantive law, there is at least a limited opportunity
to appraise the skill with which the editor has developed his subject in
the order and arrangement of the principles illustrated by the decisions
selected. Also it may be that the compiler will have had the opportunity
to advance his own theories, at least by implication, in the presentation of
the subject through a skillful selection of cases in which the reasoning
coincides with his own views. There may even be opportunity for a logical
arrangement of topics and foot note discussions which will help the student
or the practitioner to orderly processes of thought. Examples of what
is meant may be found in such case books as those pioneers given pri-
marily for student use, by Professor Langdell and his associates on sub-
jects such as Equity Jurisdiction, Trusts, Bills and Notes, Contracts and
I See a note in (1924) 13 CALIF. L. REv. 71.
2 See Lucas, C. I. F. Contracts on the Pacific Ocean (1924) Wash. Bar
Ass'n Rep. 65.
3 1 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 280c-f, and a comment by Professor
Llewellyn in (1923) 32 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 711.
4 Wills & Sons Ltd. v. Cunningham, Son & Co. Ltd. [1924] 2 K. B. 220,
221.
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Real Property. Primarily selected for student use, these works have found
a place in the libraries of many practicing lawyers.
The general subject of pleading in its aspects as a crystallization of the
processes developed by the machinery of the common law over a period of
centuries has its scientific side and is one which has an interest and
certain possibilities with respect to presentation by text or case book. Thc.
possibilities have been grasped by a masterful hand in the work of Pro-
fessor Ames. He, however, treated the subject in its character as the
foundation only for the modern systems of pleading and practice which
have developed in jurisdictions which trace their judicial systems to the
English common law, and made no attempt to follow it further. Treat-
ing the subject in this light, Professor Ames was able to produce a case
book on common law pleading which was in its way a masterpiece of
brevity, and which has become a classic on the subject treated, being quite
as much distinguished by the cases omitted as by the cases selected.
It is with some trepidation that the reviewer takes up for comment the
two volumes, comprising more than 1700 pages of Rothschild's Capc3 oa
New York Practice. It is obvious that such comment must be preceded
by dismissing from the mind any thought of a subject capable of treat-
ment in the cohesive and systematic manner in which a branch of the
substantive law might be treated. We are obliged to approach the sub-
ject with a doubt as to whether or not a civil practice act and a set of
court rules will respond to the scientific study and logical arrangement
which Professor Rothschild courageously attempts to make the basis of
his selection of cases and his order of treatment.
Such an attempt is to be commended and perhaps there has been achieved
a certain degree of success, for Professor Rothschild has at least had
in mind a definite plan. The reviewer is impressed, however, with the
thought that the order in which the different processes involved in the
subject of practice under statutory provisions may be advantageously pre-
sented through cases, is to a large extent pre-determined. In the revision
of a practice act or set of court rules, we have the restatement of certain
material which has been stated and restated many times before, which
has been arranged and rearranged and which is the product of many
minds not only viewing the subject from the logical but also from the prac-
tical standpoint. The result is that, with each successive revision, we are
likely to have an arrangement which is logical to the extent that logic
can enter into the work without sacrifice of practical considerations in
the use and application of the processes provided for. With this in mind,
we are not fully convinced that there is a field for the application of a
scientific plan or logical system of treatment of the subject of practice
as applied to any one jurisdiction, which depar6 in any considerable de-
gree from the established order created by statutory authority. We agree
with Professor Rothschild that practice is not a subject "composed of un-
related topics to be memorized" but, when dealing with a particular prac-
tice act and set of rules, we are not wholly in agreement with the state-
ment that practice thereunder is "capable of scientific study based upon
fundamental principles which can be developed in logical order," and
that a case book can be arranged entirely on that theory.
Professor Rothschild's plan has been to arrange the cases selected so as
to bring up the several topics covered (and which will presumably be
the subject of classroom discussion) in a certain logical order, to wit, "ac-
cording to the mental processes which may be successively experienced in
the preparation of the case." For use by Professor Rothschild in his own
teaching work, the arrangement of cases will, of course, be admirably
suited to his development of the subject but there is question whether the
mental processes successively experienced in the preparation of a case
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will always be the same with different teachers, some of whom may have
their own conception of the relation between the several topics. Might
not the average teacher, student or practitioner find a case book more use-
ful which followed the statutory order of topics treated?
Professor Rothschild undertakes to arrange the cases in the order in
which a competent lawyer must decide questions in preparing his case
for litigation. This order he summarizes as including successively certain
problems: to what court he is to apply, the form and extent of relief to
be asked for, the applicability of the statute of limitations, election of
remedies, res judicata, joinder of parties and causes of action. Not until he
has considered these is the lawyer ready to draw his complaint. Doubt-
less these problems may be involved in the institution of a suit, but they
are problems which may lead the practitioner into many fields of legal
discussion other than practice unless by judicious selection of cases dis-
cussion be held to points where questions of practice are involved. Hero
the compiler has succeeded admirably in his choice of illustrations and in
the material selected for printing.
On the whole, Professor Rothschild has gathered together a good as-
sortment of cases, illustrative of certain phases of practice under the
Civil Practice Act and the Rules. There has been no attempt to cover
many of the sections of the Practice Act, notably such parts as those relat-
ing to evidence, to appeals, to real property actions, actions for penalty
and actions against judgment creditors. In fact, there is little illustrative
of practice in the many Particular Actions and Proceedings provided for
by the Practice Act. These omissions suggest a possible intent to supple-
ment the work by a further volume, although no such purpose is an-
nounced.
The convenience in getting at the different topics treated and the pro-
visions of the statutes and rules to which they relate has been greatly
promoted by the admirably prepared tables and indexes and perhaps more
than anything else, references in every case, where the practice act is
referred to, to the corresponding section in the old code of procedure.
The book will be of little service to the practitioner but, as a depository
of a well selected group of cases on the parts of the Practice Act and the
Rules which are covered, will serve a useful purpose to the teacher and
student. If, in some instances, there seems to be a superfluity of cases,
it will serve as the author himself states "to permit of omissions by the
instructor according to his own preferences."
JOHN JAY MCKELVEY
Cases and Other Authorities on Equity. One Volume Edition. By Walter
Wheeler Cook. St. Paul; West Publishing Company, 1926. pp. xix, 1179.
The individual books constituting Professor Cook's trilogy of casebooks
on Equity have been widely reviewed and are well known. This one-
volume consolidation does not add to the material there presented. Rather,
it condenses the treatment of the same field (except for one large and two
small topics). from an aggregate of 2673 to 1167 pages, a reduction in
space of about three-fifths. The original classification has been kept
intact.
Volume one contains 798 pages net. Part I of the new edition handles
all of the same topics save the extra-territorial recognition of equitable
decrees, in 389 pages. Volume two ran to 833 pages. Part II of the one-
volume work retains every one of the original subdivisions and covers 399
pages. Volume three carried 1042 pages. These have been cut to 379.
In the earlier book, the editor had combined "the material usually pre-
sented in advanced, equity courses dealing with reformation, rescission and
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restitution with that contained in the course commonly called quasi-con-
tracts." Nearly all of the quasi-contract cases are now omitted. So is
Part IV of volume three.
In choosing from the materials first published, the editor has been guided
somewhat, especially in the dropping of the quasi-contract cases, by the
instructors' requests that led to this edition. In large measure, however,
the new arrangement represents the editor's own ideas as to the relative
importance of the cases making up the larger collection. Those using
units of the three-volume set will be interested in comparing this align-
ment with their own selections. They will probably agree that the editor's
task has been skillfully albeit ruthlessly accomplished.
The notes carry references to and comments upon many of the cases
dropped from the text, and for the omitted quasi-contract cases there are
cross-references to volume three and to the treatises of Keener and Wood-
ward. The many citations in connection with the specific performance
cases to 36 Cye might well have been changed, however, into references to
the new third edition of Pomeroy's treatise. This superseded the encyclo-
pedia article and became available before the volume under considera-
tion went to press.
The collection will make an effective basis for a six semester-hour course
in Equity, especially in schools where it is thought best to continue the
separate course on quasi-contract out of casebooks exclusively devoted to
that subject. And it will enable the instructor to do a better job than
is practicable on the basis of the three volume set, with the admirable
chapter on the powers of courts of equity. He can now begin with the
historical introduction, jump over to injunctions, go through specific per-
formance, and then cover reformation, rescission and restitution, before
taking up the chapter mentioned. This broad preliminary contact with a
wide variety of equitable remedies will lay a basis for the student's appre-
ciation of the juristic significance of the chancellor's powers.
The book is not suited for superficial work. The major problems are
there, in all of their difficulty and importance, even if some of the re-
finements and curiosities have been relegated to the notes.
M. T. V,%N HE=Im
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